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CONSERVATION AND THE COMMISSION: THE 
GROWTH OF REGULATION OF THE END USE OF 
NATURAL GAS BY THE FEDERAL POWER 
COMMISSION 
By William S. Stowe* 
This case is another in the long-running and seemingly endless saga of 
"Who Gets The Gas?, "starring the major oil companies, the natural gas 
pipelines, major industrial users of natural gas, and the Federal Power 
Commission. I 
The current energy shortage has profoundly affected much of 
America's way of life. Shortages have created long lines, layoffs, 
curtailments of service and restrictions across the entire economy. 
One realization that has been forcefully brought home is that the 
energy crisis is not only a problem of short supply, but also of who 
gets what little there is. The acutely political nature of this process 
has been obvious throughout the recent debates on rationing and in 
the orders of the Federal Energy Office which shift supplies of oil 
and gasoline from state to state. This controversy over the allocation 
of energy resources has had its fullest development to date in the 
regulation of natural gas by the Federal Power Commission under 
the Natural Gas Act.2 This article will discuss that regulation in the 
context of the problems of conservation of natural gas and the cur-
rent shortage of supply. 
The shortage of natural gas is fundamentally a problem of imbal-
ance between the forces of supply and demand in the energy market. 
A number of commentators have remarked recently upon the role 
of the FPC in the problem of inadequate supply, and there have 
been numerous proposals for the de-regulation of wellhead prices in 
an effort to stimulate additional production.3 While such prices are 
undoubtedly too low, there has been no convincing demonstration 
that, in the short run, sufficient supplies can be drawn out to meet 
projected demands at any price.4 In addition, there appears little 
political likelihood that natural gas prices will be de-regulated to 
the extent required to balance supply and demand in the near fu-
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ture. A somewhat smaller amount of discussion has surrounded the 
entire question of regulatory actions affecting demand. Demand 
reduction and allocation seem somehow tainted in an expansionist, 
free-market economy, but there can be a number of possible reasons 
for embarking upon such a course of action. In a time of shortage, 
of course, there is no alternative. 
I. CURRENT SHORTAGE 
In the natural gas industry various individuals have warned of 
impending shortages for several decades. Exactly what constitutes 
a shortage, however, is a difficult definitional problem, especially 
with a resource like natural gas. As pointed out by Justice Jackson 
thirty years ago: 
The heart of this problem is the elusive, exhaustible, and irreplaceable 
nature of natural gas itself. Given sufficient money, we can produce any 
desired amount of railroad, bus, or steamship transportation, or com-
munications facilities, or capacity for generation of electric energy, or 
for the manufacture of gas of a kind. In the service of such utilities one 
customer has little concern with the amount taken by another, a volume 
of service can be created equal to demand, and today's demands will not 
exhaust or lessen capacity to serve tomorrow. But the wealth of Midas 
and the wit of man cannot produce or reproduce a natural gas field. 5 
As a starting point, it is certain that there must be some finite 
upper limit to our total natural gas supply. Two recent and widely 
quoted estimates by the Potential Gas Committee (PGC) and the 
United States Geological Survey (USGS) have been used in discus-
sions of the domestic supply situation.8 The USGS figure estimates 
a total resource base within the United States of 6,560 trillion cubic 
feet (tcf) of natural gas. Excluding various resources classified as 
submarginal or unrecoverable, the USGS is left with a figure of 2100 
tcf. The somewhat lower PGC estimate is 1178 tcf. Both of these 
latter figures are described as "undiscovered recoverable potential 
supplies" or "natural gas that may be found under existing explora-
tion technology and produced under approximately current condi-
tions of economics and technology." Given current usage of 22.5 tcf 
per year,1 these estimates give the United States about a 50 year 
supply of natural gas using the PGC figures, or a 100 year supply 
using the USGS figures. In terms of projected increas'es in 
consumption, and given the fact that these reserves must first be 
located, the lifetime is, of course, considerably less. 
Another measure of natural gas supply is the reserves to produc-
tion ratio (RIP). Since 1946 when the RIP ratio was 32.6, it has 
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declined to 22.1 in 1955, 20.1 in 1960, 17.6 in 1965, and 12.6 in 1971. 8 
Despite the decline in RIP ratio, the total amount of proven reserves 
grew steadily as additions exceeded production in every year up 
until 1968. Since then, however, the production has exceeded the 
new discoveries and the total proven reserves have fallen by nearly 
20 percent in the lower 48 states.9 Even the inclusion of Alaska 
leaves us with proven reserves sufficient for only 12 more years 
assuming no increase in consumption. 
A third indication of the shortage of natural gas supply is given 
by the unmet demands. Within the past three years, major natural 
gas distributors have, for the first time, been forced to refuse re-
quests for additional service from expanding industrial customers 
and from many new customers. Since then interruptible sales by 
numerous companies have been completely curtailed and some 
companies have been forced to curtail deliveries to their firm cus-
tomers by as much as one-third. 10 The volume of such curtailments 
of firm contract customers is expected to rise by another 53 percent 
during the year ending in August 1974Y Describing the effects of 
these curtailments, the FPC has said that they will result: 
. . . in severe economic and environmental consequences, resulting in 
the closiI).g of schools and factories, the denial of utility service to new 
customers, the utilization by industry and electric utilities of alternate 
fuels which impact upon ambient air quality standards, and the transfer 
of unfulfilled demand to other fuels in short supply with the resultant 
upward price pressures. 12 
Trends for the future are more difficult to ascertain, but most 
observers agree that demand will continue to outstrip supply by 
larger and larger margins. 13 The one thing that is certain, whether 
one uses the long-range potential reserves or the short-range picture 
of curtailments and declining RIP ratio, is that some sort of policy 
of conservation or demand reduction is needed. The FPC has 
termed this period an "historic turning point-the end of natural 
gas industry growth uninhibited by supply considerations."u This 
"turning point" has been reflected in a series of orders and opinions 
during the past three years wherein the FPC has abandoned several 
long standing growth policies and has gradually been developing an 
allocation policy to cope with the shortages. 15 Although these poli-
cies are largely ones of reaction to the acute problems of the current 
shortages, their roots can be traced back to the inception of natural 
gas regulation. 
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE NATURAL GAS ACT 
The problems which led to the enactment of the Natural Gas Act 
in 1938 were not problems of shortages or of conservation but were 
basically ones of consumer protection and anti-trust. This perspec-
tive is reflected by the limited powers and jurisdiction granted by 
the Act. Section 1(a) gives recognition to the source of the Natural 
Gas Act: "As disclosed in reports of the Federal Trade Commission 
. . . it is declared that the business of transporting and selling 
natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a 
public interest."16 Among findings of the FTC Report were that 
ownership of the large utility corporations was highly concentrated, 
that assets and rate bases were inflated in value, that speculation 
in utility securities was rampant, and was fed by misleading and 
inaccurate accounting, and that ratepayers and the general public 
were suffering in the form of higher rates and unreliable service. 17 
Although natural gas companies were regulated by the states 
prior to the Natural Gas Act, many of the above abuses were beyond 
the states' control. Previous decisions of the Supreme Court had 
seriously limited state efforts to regulate several of the interstate 
aspects of the natural gas pipelines, and the pipelines used the 
facades of holding companies and subsidiaries to take full advan-
tage of these regulatory gaps. IS As a result, the Natural Gas Act was 
designed to create a comprehensive scheme of dual federal and state 
regulation. IS This concept of cooperative yet complete regulatory 
authority has been a dominant theme in decisions under the Natu-
ral Gas Act and has been both a limiting and an expansive factor 
in deriving FPC jurisdiction and powers. 
The role of conservation in the FTC Report and in the Natural 
Gas Act has been a particularly thorny issue. During the 1930's vast 
supplies of natural gas had only recently been discovered in the 
Southwestern states. Thi3 gas was often treated as a nuisance and 
was either flared on the spot or sold at extemely low rates for the 
production of carbon black or gasoline. The first enumerated con-
clusion of the FTC Report deplored this problem specifically: 
1. Conservation is the first problem that demands attention. Vast 
acreage is being drained and natural gas is being subjected to profligate 
and wanton waste and uneconomical uses. This has been estimated to 
amount to as much as a billion and a quarter cubic feet per day in one 
field. Witnesses having expert knowledge testified that this amount of 
daily waste is sufficient to supply the entire present needs of the domes-
tic and commercial users of natural gas in the United States. 20 
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The conservation which was referred to by the FTC Report was 
viewed generally as a matter of state concern. The sole proposal of 
the report regarding conservation was in the form of a recommenda-
tion that states should enter into interstate compacts on conserva-
tion, with accompanying federal legislation prohibiting interstate 
shipments of gas produced in violation of state conservation laws. 21 
While conservation, in the sense of prevention of physical waste 
in production, was probably within the power of the various states 
to resolve, there was another aspect of the conservation problem 
that proved more troubling. This was the wasteful use of natural gas 
in various applications-principally as boiler fuel-for which a more 
plentiful fuel was available. Since this involved the use of the gas, 
quite apart from its production, it was generally outside the regula-
tory powers of the producing states, since its regulation would have 
been an interference with interstate commerce. 22 In any event, pro-
ducing states were not yet convinced that conservation was neces-
sary at all, and some were still interested in spurring consumption, 
to get as much economic benefit as soon as possible. 23 
Neither producing nor consuming states had control over the uses 
to which natural gas was put in another state. Even though a state 
may have had the power to pass conservation laws aimed at wasteful 
uses within its own boundaries, it could only do so by putting itself 
at a competitive disadvantage with other states not similarly in-
clined. Indicative of this dilemma was In re Cabot Gas Corp., 24 a 
1936 decision of the New York Public Service Commission which 
granted a certificate for the construction of a pipeline to serve sev-
eral large industrial concerns, notwithstanding the likely waste of 
the natural gas supply. Decrying the inability of the Commission to 
effectively deal with the dissipation of gas resources by wasteful uses 
and the failure of the federal government to step in to lead in conser-
vation efforts, the chairman pointed out: 
... what will be gained to consumers in the state of New York if the 
petition is denied .... If restriction is imposed on the use of it in New 
York, it may go to Pennsylvania; and if the petitioner is not allowed to 
supply the areas which it is proposed to serve, the gas will go to other 
areas and there is no assurance that it will be used any more beneficially 
from a public viewpoint than it will be if the petition is granted. 25 
Although such a problem could be solved in theory by cooperation 
among the various states, their record in this regard has not been 
remarkable. 26 
III. PROVISIONS OF THE NATURAL GAS ACT 
The Natural Gas Act confers jurisdiction upon the FPC over three 
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things: (1) the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce; 
(2) the interstate sale of natural gas for resale for ultimate public 
consumption; and (3) natural gas companies engaged in such trans-
portation or sale. 27 The limited nature of this jurisdiction is empha-
sized by the express exclusion of jurisdiction over the production of 
natural gas and the intrastate transportation or sale of natural gas.28 
Pursuant to this grant of jurisdiction the FPC was granted "broad 
power to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of 
natural gas companies."29 Sections 4 and 5 give the Commission 
power to investigate and fix all rates and charges for any transporta-
tion or sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion.30 Section 7 gives the Commission power to issue certificates of 
public convenience and necessity which are required before a com-
pany may "engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or undertake the con-
struction or extension of any facilities therefor."31 Within the same 
section the FPC is given power, under certain circumstances, to 
permit the abandonment of natural gas facilities or to compel the 
extension or interconnection of such facilities.32 Section 11 contains 
the sole provision relating to conservation and, in line with the FTC 
Report, it is primarily an indirect function in aid of the states' 
primary authority.33 Other provisions of the Act give the FPC au-
thority to require various forms and accounts, conduct investiga-
tions, issue reports and engage in such other housekeeping functions 
as are necessary to administer the Act and carry out its purposes.34 
The question that was left only partly answered by the Natural 
Gas Act was to what end should natural gas be regulated. Although 
the obvious answer is stated clearly at the outset-in the "public 
interest" -the question remains as to how the public interest is to 
be determined. The standards contained within the Act for the set-
ting of rates-"just and reasonable"35 and "no undue prefer-
ence"36-together with the standards for certification proceed-
ings-"public convenience and necessity"37-are not definitive. 
What they suggest, however, is that the Commission should look 
outward to society in making its judgments, and that the Commis-
sion should have wide discretion in making those judgments. 
IV. CONSERVATION POLICIES 
Analysis of the Commission's conservation policies may be fo-
cused upon four related questions: Is conservation a proper consid-
eration in formulating FPC policy? Is conservation necessary? Is its 
importance outweighed by other factors? How should conservation 
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be carried out? The question of the propriety of considering conser-
vation at all will be deferred until discussion of specific regulatory 
actions. It will be noted, however, that virtually all decisions affect-
ing the use of natural gas will inevitably affect conservation in some 
manner. Although Section 11 of the Act is the only section explicitly 
dealing with conservation, there is nothing in the Act to indicate 
that this reference is exclusive. Certainly, since Section 11 is re-
garded as dealing with problems of physical conservation,38 the in-
ference is strong that economic conservation is not excluded from 
the Commission's determination of the broad public interest. 
The need for conservation implies the necessity of holding back 
the impetus to consume because, for some reason, present consump-
tion is overvalued as compared to future consumption. This can be 
distinguished from the present situation of an actual physical shor-
tage only insofar as the need for conservation is theoretical and less 
immediate-reflecting only the fear of running out. Another possi-
bile reason for a policy of conservation is damage to competing 
interests. Historically such interests have included coal, railroad 
and labor groups. Because of the frequency with which these groups 
have opposed the expansion of the natural gas industry and raised 
arguments of conservation, they too have often been termed "con-
servationists. " 
The weight given to the different factors militating against a re-
duction in the consumption of natural gas has been the chief obsta-
cle to the implementation of a policy of conservation. The strongest 
single factor has been economic-the more gas that is consumed, 
the cheaper each unit of gas becomes. In addition, a reduction in 
the use of natural gas may not occur evenly throughout the year. 
This would result in expensive facilities lying idle with a resultant 
increase in per unit costs. On the other hand, this detriment may 
be mitigated through the use of storage facilities. The decision to 
restrict the use of natural gas must include considerations of air 
quality and economic inconvenience to those who would wish to 
obtain natural gas service, but are unable to. The weight assigned 
to each of these factors depends upon the local air quality and the 
availability of alternate fuels. Similarly, the importance assigned to 
a policy of conservation is directly related to the conditions of shor-
tage that prevail. Today's shortage of production, however, was yes-
terday's shortage of reserves and that was the day before's inade-
quate efforts to find those reserves. The Commission has been justly 
criticized for its failure to perceive changes in these factors some-
what quicker than it has. 39 
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The decision to conserve natural gas implies a decision to allocate 
natural gas. Major elements of FPC allocation policy have focused 
on three competing entities-producing and non-producing states, 
inferior and superior uses of natural gas, and new and existing cus-
tomers. Although the policy which has been adopted by the Com-
mission is allocation based on end use,40 each of these alternatives 
has some current force. The selection of an allocation policy also 
answers the question of "Who Gets the Gas?" 
Allocation based upon the distinction between new and existing 
customers reflects little more than a policy of first come-first 
served.41 It is a choice, however, which is easy to administer. It 
probably stirs up relatively little antagonism, and it does not harm 
customers' reliance interests in their equipment investments. It pro-
vides no answer to the problem, however, when the shortage is acute 
and even existing customers are affected. In addition, natural gas 
service is not amenable to devices such as waiting lists since the 
typical customer has to make an investment in equipment. More-
over, such a policy does not answer the ultimate question of who 
actually needs the gas the most-an issue which must be addressed 
if such a policy is to reflect the public interest. 
Regional distinctions in the use of natural gas have in the past 
been widely urged. 42 It makes economic sense for regions rich in 
indigenous reserves of gas to utilize this capacity, and it makes 
similar sense for other regions with supplies of coal, water power, or 
accessibility to imports to utilize their capacities. Beyond this inevi-
table comparative advantage, however, it seems a highly provincial 
and dangerous policy to allocate natural gas to states depending 
upon whether or not they produce natural gas. 43 Certainly there is 
nothing to suggest that users in Louisiana or Oklahoma actually 
need natural gas more than users in South Dakota or Vermont. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the division of jurisdiction over natural 
gas, there has developed a pattern of regional allocation. 44 While 
wellhead prices regulated by the Commission have been kept at low 
historical levels, new supplies of natural gas have been increasingly 
attracted to the non-jurisdictional intrastate market. This supply 
leakage has had the tendency to undercut other policies of allocation 
which the FPC might wish to pursue, and has tended to distort 
otherwise economic factors of competition between the various 
states. 45 
The distinction between inferior and superior uses of natural gas, 
or end use control, is based upon economic efficiency. As pointed 
out by the FPC in its 1940 Annual Report: "General use of natural 
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gas under boilers for the production of steam is ... under most 
circumstances of very questionable social economy."48Such use in-
cludes industrial processes relying on steam and the generation of 
electricity. For these purposes it makes very little difference 
whether coal, oil, or natural gas is llsed, as far as efficiency is con-
cerned. Insofar as these other fuels are more plentiful, however, it 
makes economic sense to utilize them in preference to natural gas. 
At the same time there are a number of premium uses of gas for 
which other fuels may not be readily substituted. These uses include 
commercial and residential uses for space heating, water heating 
and cooking, chemical uses as a raw material, as well as various 
industrial processes which depend upon the flexibility and high heat 
content of natural gas. 47 Insofar as there is a shortage, once again it 
makes economic sense to prolong supplies by restricting the use of 
natural gas to those purposes which cannot be satisfied by other 
fuels. 
Historically, however, national policies have encouraged low-
grade industrial, boiler fuel and electrical generating use of natural 
gas. Rates have been kept low for these categories by artificial cost 
manipulations in order to keep such users from switching to other 
fuels. 48 Regional variations in natural gas use reveal that industrial 
and power plant users have congregated in producing states,49 be-
yond Commission jurisdiction and thus beyond Commission policies 
affecting end use. 
End use policies have been the target of considerable skepticism 
and criticism. Some of this has been due to doubt that there is such 
a thing as an "inferior use" of natural gas,50 or that the FPC is 
capable of handling such a comprehensive scheme of use regula-
tion. 51 Some of this criticism can be stemmed in part, at least, by a 
close look at each user's situation, including the nature of his use, 
the purpose of his use, the availability of other fuels and the costs 
of doing without. These criteria presumably are the same as those 
which a user himself would employ in making a decision as to 
whether to purchase natural gas. But with natural gas prices at an 
artifically low, regulated level such decisions never take place-
simply because natural gas is the cheapest alternative for all users. 
End use controls thus will tend to simulate the market function in 
a situation where the price is regulated below market-clearing 
levels.52 
FPC policy regarding conservation has come to be associated with 
problems of end use. The history of natural gas regulation by the 
Commission reveals a slow development of a policy regarding end 
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use. This article will examine three major areas of regulation as they 
have affected FPC policies towards conservation: certification, rate 
setting, and curtailment. 
V. CERTIFICATION 
As originally enacted the certification power of the FPC was lim-
ited to those cases where the market was already being served by 
another natural gas company; if a company wished to extend service 
to a totally new territory, the Commission had no power to act. 53 In 
Kansas Pipeline and Gas Co., 54 the Commission was asked to grant 
a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the construction 
of a pipeline. They were urged by intervenors "to weigh broad social 
and economic effects of the use of various fuels." The Commission 
declined, pointing out that the restriction on their certification 
power together with all of the other provisions of the Act meant that 
they were to confine their study to economic factors other than 
conservation. 55 This restriction was roundly criticized by the Com-
mission the following year: 
The Natural Gas Act as presently drafted does not enable the Commis-
sion to treat fully the serious implications of such a problem. The ques-
tion should be raised as to whether the proposed use of natural gas would 
not result in displacing a less valuable fuel and create hardships in the 
industry already supplying the market, while at the same time rapidly 
depleting the country's natural gas reserves ... The Commission is 
convinced that these conservation problems are of such preeminent 
importance especially in the present world situation, that the Natural 
Gas Act should be immediately broadened to give the Commission ade-
quate power to resolve them in the public interest. 56 
In response to the Commission's criticism, Congress amended 
Section 7 in 1942 to its present reading. 57 While the most direct 
effect of the amendment was to extend certification power to all 
jurisdictional transportations or sales, implicit was acquiescence 
with the Commission's position that it should be able to consider 
all relevant portions of the public interest, including conservation, 
in determining the public convenience and necessity.58 Neverthe-
less, having fought the battle and seemingly won, the Commission 
began to proceed in a most cautious manner. In Memphis Natural 
Gas Co. ,59 one of the first certificate cases decided after the amend-
ment, the FPC declined to give any weight to the contention that 
the use of gas for particular purposes was wasteful. Shortly there-
after the Commission announced a major investigation of the whole 
subject of conservation and end use. 60 In its 1944 Annual Report, the 
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Commission even went so far as to disclaim the existence of author-
ity to deal with conservation problems: 
It has been the unanimous view of the Commission that, inasmuch as 
the Congress had not given it compreilensive powers to deal with the end 
uses for which natural gas is consumed, and had granted the Commis-
sion no authority to regulate rates for the direct sales of natural gas to 
industry, it was the duty of the Commission not to seek to exercise such 
authority until the Congress amended the Natural Gas Act to confer on 
the Commission such specific powers as Congress desired it to exercise. HI 
Despite the Commission's desire for comprehensive or specific pow-
ers to consider end use, such powers were not forthcoming from 
Congress. During the late 1940's and the early 1950's bills were 
introduced and legislation urged to accomplish these goals, but 
gradually these efforts died out. 82 
Even though the Commission felt that it lacked complete powers 
over all issues of conservation, it was clear that it did have, at the 
very least, incomplete powers.83 From 1945 on, references to conser-
vation and end use began appearing in FPC certification decisions. 84 
The first cases were generally determined on the basis of economic 
factors such as adequacy of supply, adequacy of demand, adequacy 
of proposed rates and revenues, and adequacy of planning and fi-
nancing to insure that the project would be a success. 85 Since the 
Natural Gas Act nowhere makes conservation a specific considera-
tion in certification proceedings, the FPC was initially reluctant to 
give it much weight. In Department of Conservation of the State of 
Louisiana v. Federal Power Commission,88 affirming Memphis Nat-
ural Gas Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the 
Commission had given "sympathetic consideration" to the fact of 
inferior use but that conservation was only one of the factors in-
volved in public convenience and necessityY 
In Northern Natural Gas Co., 88 the FPC refused, largely on the 
grounds of end use, to grant a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity for a pipeline to serve a power company which would use 
the gas as boiler fuel. This was the first time that such considera-
tions became of sufficient importance to be cited as a reason for the 
denial of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Three 
years later, however, the Commission reversed itself and awarded 
the certificate. 89 By this time, there were intrastate, non-
jurisdictional distributors serving numerous similar users in the 
same area, and the Commission felt it would be discriminatory to 
ceuse this particular consumer to be denied service. 
In following cases, the Commission continued to refer to consider-
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ations of end use and seemed to place increasing importance upon 
such factors in its certification decisions: "We have repeatedly held 
that the use of natural gas as boiler fuel is an inferior usage and that 
while it is not to be denied in all situations, it should be permitted 
only on a positive showing that it is required by public convenience 
and necessity."70 However certification cases rarely created black 
and white choices between conservation and waste, or superior and 
inferior end uses. 
As natural gas pipelines expanded to serve new regions of the 
country during the 1940's and 1950's, they added large numbers of 
new customers. Because of the use of natural gas for space heating, 
the demand was highly seasonal. Serving only the residential and 
premium-use market would have created a situation with a very 
high winter peak of service and a valley during warmer periods. The 
pipeline, of course, would run most economically at a high load 
factor. Large industrial and electrical users with a multiple fuel 
capacity were willing to buy natural gas at a high load factor, or 
were willing to buy gas interruptibly to fill the pipelines' valley 
periods and to supplement their own fuel capacity. This improved 
the pipeline efficiency and in return the pipelines offered lower 
rates to attract such customers. This arrangement gave financial 
advantages to all parties, including somewhat lower rates even for 
the on-peak users. 
Therefore, despite excellent rhetoric regarding the wastefulness 
of boiler fuel usage, the Commission rarely did anything about it. 
Between 1938 and 1960 there were only four applications for a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity which were refused 
on the grounds of inferior end use. 71 In three of those cases the 
particular user eventually ended up with natural gas service not-
withstanding the previous certification denial.72 
The only major challenges to the FPC certification procedure dur-
ing this time came from conservationists, who alleged the failure of 
the Commission to give proper weight to factors of end use and 
competitive injury. On each occasion the Commission's judgment 
was upheld. 73 The general rules that emerged were that intervenors 
would be freely allowed in certificate proceedings, but that the FPC 
was not bound to consider end use nor did it need to give end use 
any special weight when it was considered. Because the Commis-
sion's mandate was broad and since no statutory obligation was 
violated in the grant of a certificate, judicial review was largely 
fruitless. Typical was the view of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals: 
"In the end the petitioners' case, though strong, cannot prevail in 
the courts after having failed before the Commission."74 
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It was not until 1961 in Federal Power Commission v. Transconti-
nental Gas Pipe Line Corp.75 (hereinafter referred to as Trans-
continental), that the Supreme Court considered the denial of a 
certificate for reasons relating to conservation. In dispute was the 
certification of the transportation <5f a large quantity of gas from 
Texas to New York City where it would be used as boiler fuel to 
generate electricity. The FPC conceded that the application met all 
of the traditional economic tests but that the public interest never-
theless required that the certificate be denied. Three reasons were 
advanced for the denial including the inflationary price level of the 
proposed transaction, the inferior use of the gas, and the preemption 
of pipeline space from gas for higher priority uses. Proponents of the 
certificate argued that the use was actually a beneficial one since it 
would replace coal and result in cleaner air. The Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals had reversed the Commission's denial of the certificate 
holding, inter alia, that the Commission had exceeded its authority 
in examining the factor of end use and exercising what amounted 
to "a general allocation and conservation authority."76 
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Court of Appeals and up-
holding the certificate denial, first acknowledged that the term 
"public convenience and necessity" gave the FPC ample authority 
"to evaluate all factors bearing on the public interest."77 However, 
due to the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon the Commission 
by the Natural Gas Act, the Court went on to examine whether the 
Commission had "trod on forbidden ground in making its deci-
sion."78 Noting the distinction between physical waste in the pro-
duction of natural gas and economic waste in the consumption of 
natural gas, the Court pointed out that the states had the ability to 
control physical waste, but were inherently unable to control the 
economic waste of gas committed to interstate commerce.79 Since, 
by the Natural Gas Act, Congress "meant to create a comprehensive 
and effective scheme" and meant to leave no "attractive gap" be-
tween the spheres of federal and state regulatory authority, consid-
erations of economic waste and end use were properly of concern to 
the Commission. so 
While Transcontinental was an affirmation of the Commission's 
decision to deny a certificate of public convenience and necessity for 
this project; more importantly, it was an affirmation of the Commis-
sion's discretion to determine what what was in the public interest. 
Both proponents and opponents of conservation have had to meet 
the same hurdle-to convince the Commission of what is the public 
interest. 
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Since 1961 the Commission has continued faithfully to consider 
factors of end use, but the jurisdictional limitations of the Commis-
sion have effectively prevented it from asserting any comprehensive 
allocation policy through its certification procedure. The vast ma-
jority of gas transported in interstate commerce is in the form of 
sales to intrastate distributors for resale. These intrastate distribu-
tors subsequently make boiler fuel sales, but the question of end use 
is never squarely presented to the FPC. Further, there is a growing 
trend for industrial boiler fuel use to be concentrated in the produc-
ing states where it is beyond the FPC jurisdiction.81 Where the Com-
mission has faced the issue, however-usually in the context of new 
direct sales for industrial use, or new sales for resale, where the 
increase is earmarked for a particular industrial user-it has refused 
to adopt an absolute rule regarding end use. 
Within the past several years, Commission decisions regarding 
certification have begun to be overshadowed by larger considera-
tions of supply inadequacy and price. In El Paso Natural Gas CO.82 
the Commission denied a certificate for the transportation of natu-
ral gas from Texas to an Arizona utility for the generation of electri-
cal power. The major basis for the Commission's decision was the 
high price proposed to be paid for the gas which would have had the 
effect of encouraging large users to "tie up ever-dwindling gas re-
serves in the field" to the detriment of smaller customers.83 The 
Commission dutifully noted that the proposed use was an inferior 
one and therefore created an additional "demerit" for the proposed 
transaction. The absence of a suggestion of possible superior uses of 
the gas, however, meant that "we are left only with the general 
proposition" and the demerit created was only "slight."84 Presuma-
bly this was "slight" in relation to the larger factor of price; but, 
although the certificate was denied, the characterization of end use 
as a problem to be seriously considered only when urged by a private 
party, seems to be a serious mis-allocation of the responsibility of 
protecting the public interest. 
In Public Service Commission of the State of New York v. Federal 
Power Commission,85 involving the transportation of natural gas 
from offshore Louisiana to a Mississippi refinery, the Commission 
conceded that a certain proportion of the gas might be used in an 
inferior manner, but noted that allowing the certificate might also 
act as an incentive for increased exploration. Considering also the 
fact that the FPC could only exercise a veto power over this particu-
lar project and could not be assured that the gas would ever find its 
way to superior uses, the Commission concluded that, on balance, 
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the certificate should be allowed. A prior Commission grant of the 
same certificate had previously been remanded for a fuller explica-
tion of these factors;86 and, although the reviewing court remained 
skeptical of any "incentives" to be found in such a transaction, they 
felt they had no choice but to affirnt the Commission's judgment: 
In this difficult time of critical gas shortage, a reviewing court must be 
particularly careful to ensure that the Commission is permitted to carry 
out its policy-making functions which Congress gave it in the Natural 
Gas Act, and we may not substitute our policy judgments for those of 
the Commission. xl 
Exercise of certification power by the Commission can be an effec-
tive method to control growth and therefore to implement policies 
of conservation. However, in a period of shortage, when the domi-
nant mode is reductions rather than extensions of service, the power 
to award certificates of public convenience and necessity is less than 
effective. The failure to grant a certificate may only result in the 
natural gas being diverted to another even less desirable use outside 
of the Commission's jurisdiction-the parallel here with In re Cabot 
Gas Corp., discussed above,88 is striking. 
More recently the shortage of natural gas has forced a number of 
pipelines to curtail deliveries to their customers. Not surprisingly, 
the FPC has adopted a priority system based upon end use and 
availablility of alternate fuels to achieve the most equitable method 
of curtailment.89 In the face of such a system, there is little sense in 
awarding a certificate of public convenience and necessity for sales 
that will be immediately subject to curtailment. 9o 
VI. RATE SETTING 
Traditional utility rate setting operates on the theory that a pub-
lic utility should receive a total revenue equal to its cost of doing 
business plus a return on its capital investment. The total revenue 
or rate level is recovered from the various users by the application 
of individual rates for particular products and services. FPC rate 
making procedures thus encompass two separate steps-the deter-
mination of rate level, which focuses on the pipelines and the produ-
cers; and the determination of rate design, which focuses on the 
users. Both rate level and rate design can have a beneficial effect 
upon the efficient utilization of our gas resources and upon conser-
vation. Rate levels can be set at an overall high level to insure 
maximum exploration and exploitation of indigenous reserves 
while, at the same time, dampening demand. This would produce 
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a situation with relatively high rates for consumers, but with a long 
term assured supply of natural gas. Rate structures can be designed 
to allow the burdens of higher rates to fall selectively upon particu-
lar users, and thus discourage or encourage conservation, high load 
factors or any. other policy deemed worthwhile. 
Theoretically, at least, the FPC could completely accomplish 
nearly any policy regarding the allocation of natural gas through the 
setting of rates. The statutory standards of "just and reasonable," 
no "undue preference" and no "unreasonable differences" in rates 
between classes of users are sufficiently broad to encompass just 
about any theory of rate making designed to protect or enhance the 
public interest. However, the concept of creative rate making to 
advance policies of conservation has been slow in being adopted by 
the FPC. 
Although it is clear that the FPC has the authority to fix rates and 
charges and although it is generally conceded that such factors as 
end use are of proper concern to the Commission within the context 
of its certification proceedings, the Commission has until very re-
cently followed the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Federal 
Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas CO.91 (hereinafter referred 
to as Hope) that considerations of conservation and end use were not 
material to the rate setting process. Hope involved a dispute be-
tween the State of West Virginia and the FPC over the rates set for 
the sale of natural gas which was produced in West Virginia and 
subsequently sold by the Hope Natural Gas Co. in other states. 
West Virginia's objections focused on several interrelated aspects of 
the need for conservation. First, the value of the natural gas, the 
discovery value of the leaseholds and the value of the other company 
property were alleged to have been understated by the FPC. The 
claimed result was that State tax revenues were depressed and the 
value of competing fuels such as coal, also a product of West Vir-
ginia, was cheapened. Additionally, state conservation policies were 
significantly harmed in that exploratory development would be dis-
couraged, abandonment of marginal wells would be hastened, and 
the secondary recovery of oil would be discouraged.92 Second it was 
claimed "that the Commission placed too Iowa rate on gas for 
industrial purposes as compared with gas for domestic purposes"93 
and that the difference in those rates was "discriminatory as against 
domestic users and in favor of industrial users. "94 
The Court pointed out in response to the first argument that the 
primary purpose of the Natural Gas Act was "to protect consumers 
against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies, "95 and 
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that the major evil against which the Act was directed was the 
maintenance of high rates based upon inflated rate bases by the 
private utility companies. DO Although the Court recognized West 
Virginia's valid interest in conservation, such interests were not 
proper subjects of FPC consideration in the exercise of its rate mak-
ing powers. In language reminiscent of current debates over windfall 
profits and price rollbacks: 
Thus Congress was quite aware of the interests of the producing states 
in their natural gas supplies. But it left the protection of those interests 
to measures other than the maintenance of high rates to private compa-
nies. If the Commission is to be compelled to let the stockholders of 
natural gas companies have a feast so that the producing states may 
receive crumbs from that table, the present Act must be redesigned.97 
To West Virginia's argument regarding end use, the Court re-
sponded that there was nothing within the Act to indicate that rates 
should be fixed to discourage particular uses. The Act contained 
only "conventional" standards of rate-making and such theories 
were held to be "novel" and without express statutory sanction.9s 
The Court avoided the claim of discrimination in favor of industrial 
users, as a result of the failure to properly present the issue before 
the Court, but indicated that the Commission itself had ample au-
thority to cure any such unreasonable differences in rates, if pro-
perly brought before them. DB 
Justice Jackson delivered a strong dissent in which he decried the 
narrowness of the public interest recognized by the majority opin-
ion. loo Justice Frankfurter in a separate dissent argued that the 
"very foundation" of the Act was the public interest and that this 
consists of more than "contemporary investors and contemporary 
consumers" and includes social as well as economic costS.101 Both 
urged the use of rates as a tool to draw out additional supplies and 
to prevent waste. Although contemporary users might enjoy a sav-
ings of a few cents per mcf, such considerations "will not be very 
satisfying to a coming generation that will look back and judge our 
present regulatory method in the light of an exhausted and largely 
wasted gas supply."102 
Hope has been widely cited for the proposition that matters of 
conservation and end use may not be considered by the FPC in the 
exercise of its rate setting jurisdiction. 103 This holding was certainly 
not required by the facts of Hope. Since the FPC had refused to 
accept West Virginia's contentions regarding conservation, the 
Court need only have upheld the FPC's discretion to consider those 
factors which it deemed relevant to the public interest, rather than 
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indicating that certain factors may not be considered. Since the rest 
of the opinion dealt at length with the proposition that the Court 
will not examine the rate-making process, only the end result;104 it 
was ironic that the Court went to such lengths to announce that 
considerations of conservation could not be part of that process. 
Superficially it would seem that if the reviewing court examined 
only the end result and found it not unreasonable, then the court 
would never know whether the Commission had engaged in forbid-
den contemplations, and certainly there would be no harm done. 
Perhaps in a broader sense, however, what Hope was really saying 
was that the factor of price to the consumer was the ultimate con-
cern of the Natural Gas Act. Since conservation means higher prices 
in the short run and since the fears of shortages were somewhat 
speculative, the preferred course was to opt for the lowered prices. 
This was buttressed somewhat by the legislative history of the Act 
regarding the role of conservation. But again, it must be remem-
bered that conservation in the ITC Report was conceived of in a 
limited sense-as the prevention of physical waste in production. lo5 
The whole area of the prevention of economic waste through inferior 
use, coupled as it is with concerns of resource depletion and ade-
quacy of future service, is another type of conservation and is one 
that seems inevitably to be a part of the rate setting process. This 
is evident from a brief analysis of the Commission's cost allocation 
process. 
Costs are generally of two forms-separable or joint. lOS Separable 
costs may be simply defined as those costs which are incurred solely 
in the service of one particular customer or class of customers. Joint 
costs are those which are incurred in the service of more than one 
customer. Theoretically each user should pay his own separable cost 
plus some portion of the joint costs. Each user, however, would 
obviously like the other to pay as much of the joint costs as possible. 
If one user has greater bargaining power, he can generally pay a 
smaller share of the joint costs and thus have lower rates. Within 
the natural gas industry this greater bargaining power is possessed 
by those users who have the capability of using alternate fuels, and 
is reflected in the much lower rates paid per mcf by those users. 
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. u. Federal Power Commission l07 
(hereinafter referred to as Colorado Interstate) involved exactly 
such a cost allocation between two customers. One, the city of Den-
ver, was a jurisdictional customer serving a mixed group of residen-
tial, commercial and industrial customers. The other, Colorado Fuel 
and Iron, was a non-jurisdictional direct sale customer using the 
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great part of its gas for boiler fuel. Both shared the same pipeline 
(except that Denver used 300 miles while the industry used only 200 
miles) and both used similar quantities of gas. The Commission 
decided that the bulk of the costs of the pipeline would be allocated 
to the jurisdictional customer with the result that the non-
jurisdictional customer was able to purchase gas (for boiler fuel use) 
at less than one fourth of the rate charged to the jurisdictional 
customer .108 The Supreme Court in upholding this cost allocation 
pointed out: 
When Congress, as here, fails to provide a formula for the Commission 
to follow, courts are not warranted in rejecting the one which the Com-
mission employs unless it plaintly contravenes the statutory scheme of 
regulation ... Allocation of costs is not a matter for the slide rule. It 
involves judgment of a myriad of facts. IOU 
If the costs had been divided on even a slightly different basis, the 
cost to the industry for boiler fuel would have been increased sub-
stantially, which might have then caused the company to use other 
fuels for its boiler.lIo The result would have deprived the jurisdic-
tional customers of the boiler fuel user's small contribution to joint 
costs, and therefore they would have to pay slightly higher rates. 
The further result, however, would have been that a wasteful use of 
natural gas as boiler fuel was discontinued and natural gas supplies 
correspondingly preserved for future use. 
Justice Jackson in a concurring opinion pointed out that there 
was no indication that the price discrepancy between the two users 
was anything other than the result of the better bargaining position 
of the industrial user}1I However, the very essence of the regulation 
of an industry is that the public interest must sometimes call for the 
alteration of bargained-for transactions that do not completely take 
into account all of the elements of that public interest. Even though 
there may be economic justification in the form of lower rates, Jus-
tice Jackson went on to denounce the principle that costs should be 
borne most heavily by the higher priority, premium use customers: 
I do not think it can be accepted as a principle of public regulation that 
industrial gas may have a free ride because the pipeline and compressor 
have to operate anyway ... If this makes low price industrial business 
less desirable, it will be in the long-range public interest. . . .112 
The thorniest problems of cost allocation have arisen with respect 
to the design of rate structures. While there are dozens of different 
theories of rate designll3 the most common, and that currently em-
ployed, is the two-part or commodity and demand rate. Quite sim-
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ply, the two-part rate is a combination of two separate charges. The 
commodity component is a charge for each separate unit of gas sold. 
The demand component is a charge to each user based upon that 
user's responsibility for the system peak, or in other words, to pay 
for the fixed capital and pipeline costs that must be paid, whether 
or not any natural gas is sold. The commodity component is gener-
ally the same for all users; however, the demand component varies 
widely depending almost entirely on how the system costs are allo-
cated among the various users. The effect of this type of rate is that 
users of natural gas who take only during the system peak pay a 
much higher charge per mef than do users who take at a 100 percent 
load factor, and both of these users pay more per mcf than do users 
who take entirely during off-peak periods or who buy on an interrup-
tible basis. 
Once a decision is reached to adopt two-part rates, the question 
becomes one of allocating specific items of pipeline expenses to 
either the demand or commodity component. This question was 
addressed by the Commission in 1952 in Atlantic Seaboard CorpY4 
If the premise were adopted that pipelines were built to serve the 
peak demand periods then the demand charge should bear all of the 
fixed pipeline costs. The commodity charge would then reflect only 
those separable costs specifically attributable to the delivery or sale 
of each unit of natural gas. In the extreme this would mean that off-
peak gas would get essentially a "free ride." Concluding, however, 
that no pipeline would ever be built to serve exclusively a narrow 
peak period, the Commission held that the fixed costs of the pipe-
line must be borne not only by the demand charge, but also by the 
commodity charge. 1I5 Exercising the wisdom of King Solomon, the 
Commission decided to split the difference and allocated 50% of 
fixed costs to the demand component and 50% to the commodity 
component, the so-called Seaboard method. 1I6 Recognizing the ad 
hoc nature of such allocation, the Commission indicated that it 
intended to be flexible in making such cost allocations in future 
cases, but would continue to use Seaboard as a starting point.1I7 
The Seaboard method of cost allocation subsequently was chal-
lenged in State Corporation Commission of Kansas u. Federal 
Power Commission ll8 where the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the FPC judgment: 
We feel it is peculiarly within the Commission's discretion to so alter 
their application of the demand-commodity approach to the problem of 
allocation as to reflect what appears to be the Commission to be impor-
tant factors not previously considered. liD 
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The Commission took a completely different approach in Alabama-
Tennessee Natural Gas CO.120 issued only one week after the 
Seaboard decision was announced. There, due to the fact that the 
fixed pipeline costs bore no close relationship to the system demand, 
the Commission rejected the two-part rate entirely and determined 
that a one-part or volumetric rate was appropriate. In Alabama-
Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission,121 the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, once again emphasizing 
the broad discretion granted to the Commission. 
The power to allocate costs, together with the discretion in exer-
cising that power, results in a great amount of influence in deter-
mining patterns of natural gas use. However, throughout the re-
mainder of the 1950's and 1960's the Commission has used that 
discretion to allocate gas to industrial and boiler fuel markets rather 
than away from them. This has occurred through the process of 
"tilting" the Seaboard cost allocation in order to lower the commod-
ity charge so that competition from other fuels could be met. 122 As 
pipelines extended to the large cities of the North and East, it was 
apparent that the load factors would be very low as a result of the 
seasonal demand unless the pipelines generated a significant 
amount of non-seasonal (Le. industrial boiler fuel) demand. Since 
a high commodity rate would not attract such off-peak usage, the 
demand charge was raised and the commodity charge lowered, by 
the simple expedient of altering the Seaboard 50-50 cost allocation. 
In making such an allocation the Commission completely ignored 
the rationale of end use conservation and relied entirely on the 
economic advantages of lower rates. 
In Fuels Research Council, Inc. v. Federal Power Commission123 
it was urged that such a policy amounted to "backward" rate mak-
ing in that the commodity charge necessary to allocate gas to in-
dustrial customers was taken as a starting point, and then the cost 
allocation was computed to justify the commodity charge. The Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless upheld the Commis-
sion's decision as "peculiarly within the Commission's compe-
tence."124 To charges that such rates were preferential and discrimi-
natory against the coal industry, the court replied that competitive 
injury may not be considered in rate proceedings. The court recog-
nized the situation as "anomalous" since the Commission was free 
to consider competitive fuel prices in designing natural gas rates, 
but the matter was "not open to question," citing Hope. 125 It was 
further urged that such rates were inimical to the public interest in 
that inferior uses of natural gas were thereby encouraged. Once 
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again the court recognized the "irony" of the Commission's discour-
aging inferior end use under its certification jurisdiction while trying 
to encourage the same end use under its powers of rate design; but 
the matter was deemed not open to dispute, once again citing 
Hope.t 26 
The reliance on Hope continued the basic rationale that the ulti-
mate goal of the Natural Gas Act was to obtain rates which were as 
low as possible to as many as possible. The interpretation of the 
Natural Gas Act so as to afford protection only to that part of the 
public interest which is served by lower rates is a serious misreading 
of the Act. Unfortunately, it has taken the arrival of actual short-
ages of supply to force that error into the open. 
In 1971, in recognition of the existing shortage of natural gas and 
the expected worsening of the supply situation, the FPC issued 
Order No. 431,127 wherein it proposed to "reexamine existing com-
modity rate levels and, to the extent necessary, ... redesign exist-
ing commodity demand rate relationships in present and future 
pipeline rate cases."128 In 1972, in El Paso Natural Gas CO.,129 the 
Comission un-tilted its cost allocations and reaffirmed its inten-
tion to conduct a "searching reappraisal" of the entire question of 
rate design:130 
Our purpose will be to arrive at a method of cost classification and 
allocation and rate design which will produce a strong economic pres-
sure towards a more efficient allocation of our fuel reserves. This will 
be directed particularly to conserving gas for residential, commercial, 
and other uses for which this clean fuel is greatly needed and discourag-
ing the use of gas for large volume industrial and boiler fuel purposes. 131 
In 1973, in United Gas Pipe Line Co., 132 the Commission contin-
ued its reexamination of demand and commodity relationships. 
Despite urging by its staff to adopt a volumetric rate, which would 
essentially represent the limiting case of 100% of fixed costs as-
signed to the commodity component and reducing the demand 
charge to zero, the Commission opted once again to split the differ-
ence-this time between the Seaboard method and the volumetric 
method. 133 The expected result will shift a further share of costs 
upon the "low priority direct and interruptible customers who are 
able to use competitive fuels" and thereby hasten their switch to 
those competitive fuels. 134 
United Gas Pipe Line Co. represents a complete acceptance, at 
least under the exigent circumstances of the energy crisis, of the 
authority to consider factors of conservation and end use in rate 
proceedings. As such it raises at least two important questions: will 
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it actually have any effect upon the conservation of natural gas, and 
will it be upheld upon review? The answer to the first question is 
impossible to determine, given the tremendous fluctuation of prices 
in the energy market during the past year and the shortages of 
alternate fuels. Certainly there have been times during the past 
several decades when an industry in need of boiler fuel has had an 
option to choose either natural gas or coal. Because that industry 
was able to purchase off-peak and because of two-part rates, they 
chose to use natural gas. The absence of two-part rates or a greater 
share of pipeline costs allocated to the commodity component would 
have caused them to use coal and correspondingly preserved a sig-
nificant proportion of our natural gas supply. 
The major obstacle to affirmance of United Gas Pipe Line Co. 
would appear to be the lingering authority of Hope. But certainly, 
insofar as Hope represents the view that the FPC may not consider 
factors of conservation in its rate setting process, it is due for an 
overhaul. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases 135 stands as ample author-
ity for the proposition that the FPC may not artifically restrict its 
view of what factors may be considered; "it is instead obliged at 
each step of its regulatory process to assess the requirements of the 
broad public interests entrusted to its protection by Congress."136 As 
a reasoned attempt to allocate costs, seeking thereby to dampen 
wasteful demand and more equitably distribute the hardships of the 
energy shortage, it would seem that the Commission's order will 
probably be affirmed. 
VII. CURTAILMENT 
When a pipeline has agreed to deliver a certain quantity of natu-
ral gas to its various customers and then is unable to obtain that 
amount of gas, there is obviously going to be trouble somewhere. 
Within the arena of private contracting and in the courts are ample 
means of resolving situations of this nature-when the product in-
volved is radios, bicycles or briefcases. When the product is natural 
gas, it is not at all clear that economic power alone or traditional 
breach of contract remedies are sufficient. Since the Federal Power 
Commission has jurisdiction over all interstate transportation of 
natural gas and is charged with enforcing "a comprehensive and 
effective regulatory scheme . . . to afford consumers a complete, 
perman"ent and effective bond of protection, "137 the Commission has 
attempted to establish equitable criteria for the reduction of de-
mand and the apportionment of available supplies. 
The first official recognition of the need for such a policy occurred 
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in April, 1971 in Order No. 431. 138 In recognition of the shortage of 
supply the Commission ordered all jurisdictional pipelines to report 
whether they were going to find it necessary to curtail deliveries. All 
pipelines so reporting were required to file proposed schedules, or 
tariffs, with the Commission setting forth a curtailment plan to 
effectuate the policies stated in the order. These policies were neces-
sarily very general: 
... jurisdictional pipeline companies shall take all steps necessary for 
the protection of as reliable and adequate service as present supplies 
and capacities will permit. . . . Consideration should be given to the 
curtailment of volumes equivalent to all interruptible sales and to the 
curtailment of large boiler fuel sales where alternate fuels are avail-
able. 139 
Underlying these policies was the concept that the most equitable 
manner of curtailment was on the basis of end use. These tariffs 
were then ordered to be applied to all natural gas transported in 
interstate commerce including both direct sales and sales for resale. 
The major challenge to these policies has been jurisdictional 
rather than substantive. In Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. Fed-
eral Power Commission 140 (hereinafter referred to as Louisiana 
Power) the Supreme Court affirmed an order by the Commission 
which implemented a curtailment plan filed by United Gas Pipe-
line Co. Louisiana Power and Light Co., a large, direct sale, boiler 
fuel customer of United, had challenged the order and the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals had held that the FPC was without juris-
diction to order curtailments of direct sales customers.141 Not seri-
ously challenged was the proposition that the FPC could order cur-
tailments at all, or for jurisdictional customers. The Supreme Court 
indicated that curtailment of service was a part of the "transporta-
tion" jurisdiction of Section l(b) and as such did not depend on any 
distinction based upon the application of the "sales" jurisdiction. 
The rationale for this holding was simply that the curtailment of 
interstate direct sales was beyond the power of the states and there-
fore Congress must have intended it to be regulated by the FPC 
under the "no attractive gap" doctrine.142 
The substantive standards to be employed in the formulation of 
curtailment plans are derived from Section 4(b) of the Natural Gas 
Act,143 in which the Commission exercises a form of equitable judg-
ment to determine who needs natural gas the most and who can 
afford to do without. This would supercede the system of private 
contracting which in many cases would have resulted in those with 
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a greater need for natural gas going without, while those with an 
alternate fuel supply continued to receive natural gas. The step 
from "no discrimination" to "curtailment based upon end use" was 
not seriously commented upon. This was somewhat surprising for it 
is certainly unusual that the application ofa "no discrimination" 
standard should lead to a systematic classification of one particular 
group of users (industry) in the lowest priority. Although the classi-
fication may make sense on the basis of the general public interest, 
or conservation, or the protection of users who are least able to take 
care of themselves, it is clearly the granting of a preference to do-
mestic users and is not neutral or non-discriminatory. Nevertheless 
the Court broadly upheld the Commission: 
We conclude therefore that the FPC has the jurisdiction asserted here 
and that the Natural Gas Act fully authorizes the method chosen by the 
FPC for its exercise. l44 
While it seems clear that the word "method" in the above quote was 
referring to the manner of implementing curtailment plans (through 
Section 4 filings rather than the lengthier Section 5 hearings), the 
breadth of the Supreme Court endorsement of the FPC actions cer-
tainly seems to encompass the decision to curtail on the basis of end 
use. U5 
In January, 1973 the Commission significantly altered its ap-
proach to curtailment plans. 146, At the heart of the new system was 
a series of eight priorities. Essentially this priority system, which 
placed domestic and small commercial requirements in the highest 
priority and boiler fuel use in the lowest, was designed to make it 
clear that "end-use considerations" should be given controlling ef-
fect.147 This order was slightly modified to a nine priority system in 
later orders and also modified to include the proviso: "where alter-
nate fuels can meet such requirements" after each of the low priority 
groups.148 The Commission also indicated that despite the set of 
priorities, deviations would be allowed upon a showing of special 
merit. 
Throughout the past year the FPC has been besieged with various 
requests for exceptions from various customers who would otherwise 
find their natural gas supply reduced. 149 It is not possible to draw 
any general rule from the present state of affairs, but it does seem 
that most industrial or electrical generation users can present plau-
sible claims of hardship merely because alternate fuels are also 
scarce. Shutdowns of plants, layoffs of workers and similar threats 
have been successful in having curtailment orders mitigated. 150 At 
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this writing there has been no final disposition of any curtailment 
case and claims for damages or for exemptions may linger on for 
several years. 
VIII. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 
Despite the major advances made by the FPC in considering goals 
of resource conservation in areas of certification, rate design and 
curtailment, the Commission has steadfastly avoided the proce-
dural obligations of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA).J51 Section l02(2)(c) requires that an environmental impact 
statement be prepared for all "major federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment."152 Significant en-
vironmental effects of FPC actions in the allocation and conserva-
tion of natural gas include not only "irreversible and irretrievable 
commitments of resources,"153 but also significant effects upon the 
quality of the air, plus indirect effects upon the demand for coal, 
oil and nuclear fuels, resulting in increased strip mining, radiation 
hazards, etc. Present FPC regulations provide for the filing of envi-
ronmental impact statements under the Natural Gas Act only in 
applications for certificates of public convenience and necessity in-
volving the physical construction of pipeline facilities. 154 Such a 
narrow reading of NEPA must inevitably lead to an inadequate 
consideration of the environmental effects of policies which either 
encourage greater use of natural gas, thereby depleting our reserves, 
or which discourage such use, thereby polluting our air. No one 
claims to know the answers to such a choice, and what is needed is 
greater study, not less. 
In a number of recent cases the FPC has fought a running battle 
with both sides of the environmental issue over their procedural 
obligations under NEPA. In Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas 
CO.,155 concerning the certification of a sale of gas for electrical gen-
eration to the Tennessee Valley Authority, the FPC obviously con-
sidered a number of environmental factors. Concluding that the 
forced use of oil instead of natural gas might cause some additional 
air pollution, but that the conservation of natural gas would "bring 
about environmental benefits in the more critical areas in which the 
gas is eventually consumed in lieu of more polluting fuels;" the FPC 
denied the certificate. 158 The Commission went on to hold that 
NEPA did not apply to these considerations. The only explana-
tion-that the FPC had no control over the actual burning of oil 
since their decision was only a denial of the sale of natural gas-was 
not only lame, but inaccurate. 
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It would seem clear that this type of case should fall under the 
mandates of NEPA. The FPC is obviously weighing two essentially 
environmental alternatives-additional air pollution or greater re-
source conservation. The Commission closed its consideration of the 
problem of air pollution with the statement: "There is nothing in 
the record, however, to suggest"157 that any air pollution would 
occur. What does such a statement mean, however, when that very 
record has been intentionally limited by the failure to prepare an 
impact statement, concerning factors that would have been sug-
gested by such a study? It may well be that the FPC reached pre-
cisely the correct decisions, but their failure to follow NEPA proce-
dures only serves to call their decision into question. 
In Arizona Public Service Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 158 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded a Commission denial 
of a certificate of public convenience and necessity on the grounds 
of the Commission's failure to comply with NEPA. Once again the 
environmental issue was the potential air pollution which might 
result from the use of a dirtier fuel instead of natural gas. On re-
mand the Commission addressed the issue of an impact statement 
and concluded once again that one was not necessary since there 
was no "significant effect on the quality of the human environ-
ment."159 The significance of the effect on the environment, of 
course, is a threshhold determination to be made by the responsible 
agency, but the FPC has consistently failed to recognize that any 
of its allocation decisions might have this type of effect. Even 
though the Commission may be technically correct as to any partic-
ular usage or non-usage (i.e. it may not make much difference 
whether A uses oil and B uses gas, or vice versa, given the fact that 
there is not enough gas for both); still the pattern of certification 
decisions regarding the allocation of gas resources across the country 
must have a significant cumulative effect. 
A slightly different issue has arisen with respect to curtailment 
orders. In Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission,180 
several large users suffered curtailment of their natural gas supply 
which necessitated a switch to dirtier fuels and consequently in-
creased air pollution. The Commission once again failed to file an 
en~ironmental impact statement, but because of the "emergency" 
nature of a curtailment situation, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the omission, citing Louisiana Power for authority that "the 
Natural Gas Act authorizes the Commission to follow summary 
procedures in exercising its curtailment powers."181 Although the 
court went on to characterize curtailment plans as "interim" activ-
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ity,162 it was never pointed out at what stage curtailment plans 
might become final or become such a major portion of FPC policy 
as to be regarded as more than emergency action which cannot be 
delayed. Certainly at some point a succession of interim actions 
becomes effectively a course of policy of major significance. Al-
though an impact statement may not be appropriate for every user 
of natural gas who is curtailed, or even for every pipeline that has a 
curtailment plan, clearly such announcements of overall policy as 
the decision to curtail gas on the basis of end use does meet the 
criterion of being major federal action having significant environ-
mental impact. 
One further factor regarding NEPA should not be overlooked. 
NEPA is more than a law requiring impact statements; it is a statu-
tory command to actually implement environmental policies and to 
give greater weight to environmental factors where that is possible 
given an agency's statutory duties. 183 As the Natural Gas Act tells 
the Federal Power Commission to regulate natural gas in the public 
interest; NEPA tells the Commission that the public interest in-
cludes the preservation of the environment. Public interest thus 
includes both the problem of air pollution, and also the problem of 
preserving our exhaustible and irreplaceable reserves of natural gas. 
The FPC has not been a willing adherent of the policies of 
NEPA.184 Although in some cases the same solution might be arrived 
at in any event, the continued disregard of NEPA cannot be re-
garded as in the public interest. The conflict between the public 
interest standard of the Natural Gas Act and the public interest 
standard of NEPA must be resolved if there is to be any effective 
resolution of the natural gas shortage or, ultimately, any resolution 
of the energy crisis. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the development of a policy of conser-
vation of natural gas by the Federal Power Commission. There is 
very little dispute over the necessity of conservation-the only dis-
pute is over how to do it. Historically the Natural Gas Act has been 
read to command the FPC to balance the interest of the investor and 
the consumer and to keep natural gas rates as low as possible. It can 
be regarded as unfortunate that policies of conservation, in particu-
lar in the area of rate design, were not implemented long before an 
actual shortage was upon us. Insofar as the current shortage may be 
only a transient phenomenon, it is to be hoped that the policies of 
conservation do not prove transient also. 
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The particular conservation policy that has been selected by the 
FPC has been one of discouraging those uses of natural gas which 
are either inefficient or which can· be eliminated and replaced with 
a fuel in greater supply. During a period of severe shortage of all 
fuels such a policy may only exacerbate the shortages of oil and coal, 
but for the long run, it can hardly be doubted that those uses of 
natural gas which can be switched to coal, should be switched. 
The major problem that the FPC faces in the implementation of 
a program of end use conservation is a jurisdictional one. An in-
creasing proportion of our natural gas is consumed intrastate and a 
large portion of this gas is consumed as boiler fuel. As long as the 
FPC has no jurisdiction over intrastate natural gas, a dual set of 
standards for natural gas users will exist. There may be strong rea-
sons for local control over exclusively local activities, but the intras-
tate sale of natural gas is not a matter of purely local concern. 
Natural gas is a national resource and there is a strong national 
interest in preserving our limited supplies for users in all states. 
Strong consideration should be given by Congress to the extension 
of FPC jurisdiction to apply similar policies of rate design, certifica-
tion and curtailment to all of the states. 
The recent increased awareness of conservation through various 
types of erid use policies represents an important step in establish-
ing a national energy policy. As the history of FPC activities under 
the Natural Gas Act has shown, it has been an uphill battle for the 
FPC to gain the right to even consider factors of end use, especially 
in the area of rate design. Where the FPC has had the authority to 
consider end use, as in its certification jurisdiction, it has been 
reluctant to give such considerations great weight. The impetus of 
the energy crisis, however, has given a tremendous spur to policies 
of demand reduction. A policy of end use conservation, especially 
one implemented through the use of rate design, can be a useful and 
beneficial tool in the advancement of the public interest, and the 
initial FPC steps in this direction are to be applauded. 
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